Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 4

Article 12

4-1-1981

Estopping the Government in Immigration Cases:
The Immigration Estoppel Light Remains
Cautionary Yellow
Tom F. Veldman

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Tom F. Veldman, Estopping the Government in Immigration Cases: The Immigration Estoppel Light Remains Cautionary Yellow, 56 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 731 (1981).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol56/iss4/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Estopping the Government in Immigration Cases: The
Immigration Estoppel Light Remains
Cautionary Yellow
Immigration cases have provided some of the most controversial circumstances under which the doctrine of equitable estoppel I has been asserted against
the federal government. Unfortunately, the federal courts have failed to establish a clear test for deciding the applicability of estoppel against the government
in these cases. As a result, there have been inconsistent holdings in factually
similar situations.
This note examines the case law2 dealing with immigration estoppel. Part I
reviews the recent development of this case law; Part II analyzes why the present
standards for applying estoppel may be misapplying prior decisions; and Part III
proposes a test for determining when to allow estoppel in immigration cases and
analyzes the proposed test by applying it to two immigration cases.
I.

Estoppel Doctrine in Immigration Cases

Traditionally, estoppel could not be asserted against the government.3 This
rule was grounded in notions of sovereign immunity 4 and separation of powers. 5
Several commentators have criticized the traditional rule because of its potential
for inequity when strictly applied. 6 Some lower courts have attempted to allevi1 "Equitable estoppel is a rule of fairness by which courts protect the reliances and expectations of
innocent persons from defeat by those who have induced those reliances and expectations." Santiago v.
INS, 526 F.2d 488, 494 (9th Cir. 1975) (Choy, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976). See generally
M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL 602-716 (6th ed. 1913); 3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE
ON EQurry JURISPRUDENCE §§ 801-812 (5th ed. 1941). As used in this note, the term "estoppel" means

"equitable estoppel against the government" unless otherwise indicated.
2 The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976) is the pertinent statutory
authority regarding immigration. In Gordon, Finality of Immigration and Nationality Deteurinations--Canthe
Government Be Estopped?, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 433, 436-53 (1964), Professor Gordon examined this statute
and its legislative history and concluded that no statutory authority existed for allowing estoppel in immigration cases. But in Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976), the court noted that "the
Government's improper actions may preclude it from deporting an alien, even if the language of the
Immigration & Nationality Act, read in vacuo, might suggest a difference [sic] result." Id. at 306 (citations
omitted). Given the absence of statutory support, this note will focus on judicial support for immigration
estoppel.

3 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 17.01 (1958). See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v.
Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917); Lee
v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366, 369-70 (1813).
4 See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 3, at § 17.01.
5 See Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 680, 686 (1954).
6 See, e.g., 2 K. DAViS, supra note 3, at § 17.09; Asimow, EstoppelAgainst the Government: The Immigration
andNaturalizationService, 1IMIG. & NATUR. L. REv. 161 (1976-77); Berger, supra note 5; Article, Estoppel and
Immigration, 22 CATH. LAw. 287 (1976); Comment, Never Trust a Bureaucrat: Estoppel Against the Government,
42 S. CAL. L. REV. 391 (1969); Comment, Emergence of an Equitable Doctrine of Estoppel Against the Government-The Oil Shale Cases, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 433 (1975); Comment, Santiago v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service-The Ninth CircuitRetreatsfirom its Modem Approach to EstoppelAgainst the Government,
1976 UTAH L. REv. 371; 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 140 (1972). Because deportation often results when estoppel is disallowed in immigration cases, courts have been especially concerned with the equitable ramifications of disallowance. See, e.g., Sun I Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1976) ("deportation is a
drastic measure that may inflict 'the equivalent of banishment, or exile,' and 'result in the loss of all that
makes life worth living' ") (citations omitted).
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ate this unfairness in certain governmental action by allowing the use of estoppel
against the government. However, the case these courts most frequently cite as
supporting estoppel, Moser v. UnitedStates ,7 was actually decided on a waiver the8
ory.
While Moser has been used to "open the door," the key estoppel case in the
immigration area has been INS v. Hibi.9 In Hi)bi, a Filipino who had served in
the United States Army during World War II filed a petition for naturalization
as an American citizen in 1967. Under the Nationality Act of 1940,'0 a noncitizen who served honorably in the United States Armed Forces during World
War II was exempted from certain literacy and residency requirements of naturalization. 1 ' The Act established a December 31, 1946 deadline for filing naturalization petitions' 2 and provided that officers be appointed to handle the
naturalization procedures for noncitizens still serving in the armed forces and
thus outside the jurisdiction of a naturalization court.' 3 Hibi argued that the
government was estopped from claiming he was too late to receive the Act's benefits on the grounds that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had
failed to advise him of his naturalization rights and to provide a naturalization
representative in the Philippines at any time when he was eligible for the Act's
benefits. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected Hibi's
estoppel argument. The Court concluded:
While the issue of whether "affirmative misconduct" on the part of the Government might estop it from denying citizenship was left open in Montana v. Kenned, no
conduct of the sort there adverted to was involved here. We do not think that the
failure to fully publicize the rights which Congress accorded under the Act of 1940,
or the failure to have stationed in the Philippine Islands during all of the time those
rights were available an authorized naturalization representative, can give rise to an
estoppel against the Government.14

Despite summarily deciding that the Hibi facts did not warrant invoking
estoppel, the Court did leave open the possibility of estoppel against the government. Its opinion prompted lower courts to adopt an "affirmative misconduct"
7 341 U.S. 41 (1951). See, e.g.,Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 1975), errt. denied, 425 U.S.
971 (1976); United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1973); 2 K. DAvis, supra note 3,
§ 17.02, at 501-04.
8 In Moser, a Swiss citizen's application for United States citizenship had been denied on the basis of
his prior exemption from military service as a neutral alien. Moser claimed reliance on a letter from the
Swiss legation which had indicated that no waiver of citizenship would result from claiming the exemption. The Supreme Court concluded that "[tlhere is no need to evaluate these circumstances on the basis
Petitioner did not knowingly and intentionally waive his rights
of any estoppel of the Government ....
to citizenship." 341 U.S. at 47.
9 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (per curiam).
10 Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 11011503 (1976)).
11 Second War Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 77-507, tit. X, § 1001, 56 Stat. 176 (1942), as arendedby Act of
December 22, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-531, 58 Stat. 886 (amending Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76853, tit. III, §§ 701-705, 54 Stat. 1137) (repealed 1952). Subsequent legislation did not renew the literacy
exemptions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1140(b) (1976).
12 Act of December 28, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-270, 59 Stat. 658 (amending Nationality Act of 1940,
Pub. L. No. 76-853, tit. III, § 701, 54 Stat. 1137) (repealed 1952).
13 Second War Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 77-507, tit. X, § 1001, 56 Stat. 176 (1942), as amendedby Act of
December 22, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-531, 58 Stat. 886 (amending Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76853, tit. III, §§ 701-705, 54 Stat. 1137) (repealed 1952).
14 414 U.S. at 8-9 (citation omitted).
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standard to determine when to allow estoppel.' 5 Unfortunately, courts of appeals have inconsistently defined and applied this standard.
A.

The Second Circuit

In the Second Circuit' 6 case of Corniel-Rodriguezv. INS,17 the petitioner had
an exemption from certain visa requirements provided she was unmarried both
at the time of application and at the time of admission to the United States.' 8 A
State Department regulation' 9 required that the government warn minor aliens
of marriageable age about this restriction and provide a special warning form to
be signed by the minor alien. The petitioner received neither the oral nor the
written warning, and shortly before coming to the United States she was married. Five years after the petitioner's arrival in the United States, the INS initiated proceedings to deport her. Petitioner argued that the government's failure
to warn her of the special marriage requirements for minor aliens estopped it
20
from claiming that she had entered the United States in violation of her visa.
The Second Circuit agreed. Noting that the Supreme Court had "taken pains
not to disturb lower court holdings" 2' receptive to the estoppel defense in citizenship cases,2 2 the court found that the government's conduct in failing to provide
the mandated warning was "fully as misleading" 23 and "at least as severe an act
of affirmative misconduct" 24 as was found in the estoppel cases left "undisturbed" by the Supreme Court. The court concluded that "[t]o permit [petitioner] to be deported, under these circumstances, would be to sanction a
'25
manifest injustice occasioned by the Government's own failures."
15 See, e.g., Simon v. Califano, 593 F.2d 121, 123 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d
697, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); Yang v. INS, 574 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1978)
(dictum); Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1976); Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488,
492-93 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
16 Although this note concentrates on Second and Ninth Circuit decisions, other federal appellate
courts have also addressed the immigration estoppel issue. See, e.g., Jung Been Suh v. INS, 592 F.2d 230
(5th Cir. 1979); Navarro v. INS, 574 F.2d 379 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978); Yang v. INS, 574
F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1978); Peignand v. INS, 440 F.2d 757 (Ist Cir. 1971). These courts, however, have either
left the issue undecided or relied on precedent found in the Ninth Circuit.
17 532 F.2d 301 (2nd Cir. 1976).
18 Act of October 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 10(a), 79 Stat. 911 (amending Immigration and
Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, tit. II, ch. 2, § 212(a)(14), 66 Stat. 163 (1952)) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1976)). Petitioner's exemption was based on her status as a "child" of a United
States resident alien. Under the immigration law, a definitional "child" must be unmarried. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(1) (1976).

19

22 C.F.R. § 42.122(d) (1980).

20 The petitioner might also have sought relief based on the argument that "[courts have looked with
disfavor upon actions taken by federal agencies which have violated their own regulations." Mendez v.
INS, 563 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977) (deportation overturned based on INS's failure to comply with published regulations). See also Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S.
260 (1954); Jung Been Suh v. INS, 592 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1979).
21 532 F.2d at 306.
22 The Second Circuit in Corniel-Rodriguez cited Lee You Fee v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1956),
rev'don othergrounds, 355 U.S. 61 (1957) and Podea v. Acheson, 179 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1950) as being among
the estoppel cases left "undisturbed" by the Supreme Court in INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (per curiam)
and Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961). 532 F.2d at 306.
23
24

532 F.2d at 306.
Id. at 307.

25

Id.
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The Niznth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit has had a major role in developing the use of estoppel
against the government in both immigration 26 and nonimmigration 27 cases.
28
Hibi, however, has caused the Ninth Circuit to reassess its progressive position.
Santiago v. INS29 presented the Ninth Circuit with its first opportunity to
address fully the immigration estoppel issue in light of Hibi.30 Santiago involved
four separate cases combined for purposes of review. Each of the four petitioners-Santiago, Paglinawan, Catam, and Khan-had been granted an immigrant
visa with a preference derived from a spouse or parent entitled to a preference
under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 3 1 For varying reasons, each failed
to comply with a visa requirement that he be "accompanying, or following to
join, [a] spouse or a parent."' 32 Upon entering the United States, three of the
petitioners were admitted without question by immigration officers. In each
case, it was evident on the face of the visa that the petitioner was entering based
on a derived visa preference. An immigration officer questioned the fourth petitioner, Khan, and discovered that he was not in compliance with the "accompanying, or following to join" language of the Act. The immigration officer
nevertheless admitted Khan without pointing out to him the requirement
breach. At subsequent hearings, the INS found that the four petitioners had
been excludable at entry and ordered them to leave the country or face deportation.
On appeal, the petitioners sought to estop the government from finding
them excludable at entry on the grounds that the immigration officers had failed
both to inform them of the "accompanying, or following to join" requirement
and to inquire as to the whereabouts of the spouse or parent from whom they
derived their visa preferences. 33 Khan also sought estoppel on the grounds that
the immigration officer had admitted him with full knowledge of his noncompli34
ance with the Act.

The Ninth Circuit focused on the concept of "affirmative misconduct,"
which it considered a prerequisite to permitting the use of estoppel. The court
reasoned that the immigration officers' failure to inform or to inquire constituted
"affirmative misconduct" only if it were more blameworthy than the conduct at
26 See, e.g., Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976); INS v. Hibi, 475 F.2d 7 (9th Cir.),rev'dper
curiam, 414 U.S. 5 (1973); Hetzer v. INS, 420 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1970); Tejeda v. INS, 346 F.2d 389 (9th
Cir. 1965).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Lazy FC Ranch,
481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970); Schuster v.
Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962).
28 See generally Asimow, supra note 6; Article, Estoppel and Immigration, 22 CATH. LAw. 287 (1976);
Comment, Santiago v. Immigration and Naturalization Service-The Ninth Circuit Retreatsfrom its Modern
Approach to Estoppel Against the Goverunent, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 371.
29 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
30 In de Hernandez v. INS, 498 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), the Ninth Circuit rejected an
could distinguish Hibi," Id. at 921.
alien's estoppel argument on the ground that "nothing in the facts ...
De Hernandez was decided before Santiago; however, because Hibi was decided after the alien's briefs were
filed in de Hernandez, neither the parties nor the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to fully address the Hibi
issues. Id.

31

8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(9) (1976).

32
33
34

Id.
526 F.2d at 491.
Id.
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issue in Hibi.35 After weighing the facts in Santiago against those in Hibi, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that estoppel was unavailable.3 6
Ninth Circuit decisions dealing with immigration estoppel after Santiago
37
have also applied the "affirmative misconduct" standard. In Sun I Yoo v. INS,
the court allowed an estoppel defense. Yoo entered the United States as a nonimmigrant student in June, 1968 and sought a permanent visa in October, 1969.
While investigating Yoo's visa application, the INS found discrepancies in the
prior employment information which Yoo had provided. In March, 1970, Yoo
sent the INS a letter written by his former employer which clarified the discrepancies. The INS nevertheless delayed acting on Yoo's visa application for ten
months, then denied it on the grounds that Yoo had given false information concerning hi prior employment. In March, 1971, the INS agreed to reconsider the
application only to deny it again on the ground that due to the processing delay
Yoo no longer qualified for the visa for which he had applied originally. The
Board of Immigration Appeals ordered Yoo deported and he appealed.
The Ninth Circuit declared that "estoppel is available where the particular
facts warrant it" 3 8 and found that the INSs unexplained one year delay 39 in
determining Yoo's preference visa eligibility constituted "affirmative misconduct."' 4 The court noted that "once an alien has gathered and supplied all relevant information and has fulfilled all requirements, INS officials are under a
duty to accord to him within a reasonable time the status to which he is entitled
by law." 4 1 The injury sustained by Yoo in reliance on the government's conduct
was such that "justice and fair play" could only be achieved by estopping the
government from denying him the benefit of labor certification. 42 The court
distinguished Santiago on the ground that the petitioners there had no right to
enter the United States when they did, while Yoo had an absolute'43right to the
labor certification he lost through the INS's "affirmative inaction.
Oki v.INS 44 involved a third Ninth Circuit application of the "affirmative
misconduct" standard. Oki had entered the United States as an exchange student in 1974. Oki obtained permanent employment in October, 1976, but did
not submit his application for employment certification until four months later.
The INS initiated deportation proceedings against Oki in March, 1977 for failure
to secure INS approval before starting work. Oki sought to estop the government
on the ground that the INS failed to warn him of the approval requirement when
35 The court sidestepped Khan's additional argument for estoppel based on the dffiler's act of admitting him with knowledge of the noncompliance, stating: "[I]t is obvious to us that the central complaint of
each petitioner is not the act of admission but the failure to inform or inquire." 526 F.2d at 493.
36 Id.
37 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976).
38 534 F.2d at 1328.
39 The majority opinion found a delay of one year measured from March, 1970, when Yoo sent the
INS the letter clarifying the discrepancies in his prior employment information, to March, 1971, when the
INS agreed to reconsider Yoo's application. Id. The dissent more accurately describes the delay as lasting
ten months-from March, 1970 to January, 1971, Wheri the INS first denied Yoo's application. Id. at 1329
(Wright, J., dissenting).
40 Cf. Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1361 (9th Cir. 1980) (dictum) (four year delay in responding to
petition for preference classification; INS estopped); Shon Ning Lee v. INS, 576 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir.
1978) (nine month delay in deciding case; Board of Immigration Appeals not estopped).
41 534 F.2d at 1328-29.
42 Id. at 1329.
43 Id.
44 598 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1979).
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it gave him the application form. 4 5 The Ninth Circuit rejected the estoppel argument, declaring: "[Ijt is not the failure to do something which may lead to estoppel against a Government agency; the conduct complained about must be an
affirmative act."'4 6 The court dichotomized "affirmative misconduct" and conbecause the
cluded that the question of misconduct did not have to be4 reached
7
failure to advise Oki did not constitute afnnadive conduct.
The test applied by the Ninth Circuit in Santiago, Sun 11 Yoo, and Oki appears to involve four separate inquiries:
(1) Did the government's conduct constitute either (a) an affirmative act, 48
or (b) an inaction after the
alien had fulfilled all requirements for
49
which he was responsible?
(2) Did the government's conduct, whether affirmative act or inaction,
constitute misconduct?50
(3) If the government's conduct constituted "affirmative misconduct," was
it more blameworthy than that found in Hibi?5 1
(4) Did the alien sustain an injury in reliance on the government's "affirmative misconduct" such that justice demands that estoppel be al52
lowed?
II.

The Misapplication of Hibi

The Second and Ninth Circuits consider governmental "affirmative misconduct" a prerequisite to applying estoppel in immigration cases. 53 This requirement, although assertedly derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Hibi, is
not in fact required by Hi'bi. 54 Hibi's discussion of estoppel and "affirmative misconduct" 55 should have had limited precedential value for several reasons.
First, Hibi was a summary reversal without benefit of oral arguments or
briefs.5 6 The Court made no finding expressly approving or disapproving estoppel against the government. The Court's consideration of the issue does imply
that estoppel is allowable in a proper case; however, Hibi gives little indication of
what might constitute such a case. Lower courts have nevertheless placed great
of Hibi in making "affirmative misconduct" a prereqemphasis on the language
57
uisite to estoppel.
The highly unusual facts of H!bzi provide a second reason for limiting its
precedential value. Hibi based his estoppel argument on a policy decision of the
United States Attorney General; 58 the "normal" case of immigration estoppel is
45 Id. at 1161-62.
46 Id. at 1162.
47

Id.

48 Id.
49 Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d at 1328-29.
50 Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d at 492-93.
51

Id. at 493.

52 Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d at 1329.
526 F.2d at 492-93.
53 See, e.g., Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d at 306-07; Santiago v. I,
54 See Comment, supra note 28, at 380-83.
55 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
56 414 U.S. at 9. See a/so Asimow, supra note 6, at 188.
57 "Lower courts seem to be developing the idea tha the government cannot be estopped except for
Neither the holding nor the language seems signifi'affirmative misconduct.' They rely on [Hibi] ....
cant." K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATiVE LAW OF THE SEVErrTES §§ 17.03 & 17.04 (Supp. 1980).
58 414 U.S. at 10-11 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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based on the actions of minor officials. 59 As the dissent in Santiago observed:
The conduct at issue in Hibi was not the negligence or malfeasance of minor
officials, but a deliberate decision of policy by the Attorney General. Although acting in the face of a contrary congressional purpose, the executive branch was attempting to advance diplomatic relations between the United States and the
government of the Philippines. Regardless of whether the Government's conduct
constituted an abuse of discretion, its decisions were so patently of the type committed to the executive branch that the Court was extremely reluctant to nullify
them
60
over 20 years later in order to relieve one individual instance of hardship.

Third, Hibi is also one of the unusual immigration cases in which balancing
the equities would dictate a decision for the government. 6 1 An alien who did not
pursue his claim of citizenship for twenty-two years 62 could not claim serious
injustice. On the other hand, a decision for Hibi could have resulted in successful
claims by thousands of other Filipinos who were similarly situated, 63 which could
have negatively affected diplomatic relations with the Philippines. 64 A decision
for Hibi could also have unduly harmed the public interest by allowing a major
influx of immigrants who would not have been subject to the normal naturalization requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act.65
Finally and most importantly, the Court in Hibi did not define "affirmative
misconduct"; it simply stated that this term did not describe the conduct in
Hibi.6 6 The Court found that Hibi did not involve the sort of conduct adverted
to in Montana v. Kennedy ,67 specifically the conduct in Podea v. Acheson 6 s and Lee
7
You Fee v. Dulles,69 two estoppel cases cited in Montana. 0
Podea and Lee You Fee applied different standards for determining the degree
59 See, e.g., Comiel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d at 301 (consular officers); Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d at
488 (immigration officers).
60 526 F.2d at 496 (Choy, J., dissenting).
61 Most immigration cases involve one petitioner seeking a right solely for his own benefit; the public
interest is not jeopardized by such an individual's legitimate assertion of estoppel. In re LaVoie, 349 F.
Supp. 68, 74 (D.V.I. 1972).
62 INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 5-6 (1973) (Hibi petitioned for citizenship in 1967 after having been
discharged from the United States Army in 1945).
63 The government estimated that as many as 80,000 Filipinos could take advantage of a holding in
favor of Hibi, including unmarried children of naturalized persons who would qualify for "first preference" visas under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1) (1976). Asimow, supra note 6, at 191 n. 123. Hibi conceded only
that a few hundred would take advantage of a decision in his favor. Id. Although any estimate is purely
speculative, it is noteworthy that 4,000 of the Filipinos still serving in the United States Army in late 1946
were naturalized when a naturalization agent was finally stationed in the Philippines. In re Naturalization
of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
64 The Philippine government's manpower concerns in 1973 would have been the major factor determining the effect of a decision for Hibi on United States relations with the Philippines. Those manpower
concerns were clearly expressed in 1945. See Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 01 S.Ct. 1513 (1981).
65 This detrimental impact on the public interest could have resulted from the naturalization of a
potentially large number of immigrants unable "to speak the English language, sign [their] petition[s] in
[their] own handwriting, or meet any educational test." Second War Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 77-507, tit.
X, § 1001, 56 Stat. 176 (1942) (amending Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, tit. III, § 701, 54
Stat. 1137) (repealed 1952). The protections provided by 8 U.S.C. § 1423(1) (1976) (literacy in English
language), 8 U.S.C. § 1423(2) (1976) (passing test on United States history and government), and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1445(a) (1976) (signing petition in own handwriting) would have been inapplicable to these immigrants
had estoppel been allowed in Hibi.
66 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
67 366 U.S. 308 (1960).
68 179 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1949).
69 236 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1956), ret/don othergrounds, 355 U.S. 61 (1957).
70 414 U.S. at 8.
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of government culpability necessary for estoppel. In Podea, the Second Circuit
granted citizenship to the petitioner despite his apparent ineligibility because he
acted in reliance on erroneous advice negligently given by the State Department. 71 In Lee You Fee, the Seventh Circuit denied citizenship to a person whose
own failure to act left him ineligible for citizenship. The court distinguished Lee
You Fee from cases in which ineligibility resulted from a person's failure to "do
something which the officials of the Government had carelessly or willfully prevented his doing."'72 Since Hibi, the Supreme Court has not clarified "affirmative misconduct," leaving further definition and application of "affirmative
misconduct" to the lower courts.
The Second Circuit in Comiel-Rodriguez applied the "affirmative misconduct" standard by comparing the government conduct in that case with the government's conduct in Podea and Lee You Fee.73 The Ninth Circuit in Santiago and
Sun I1Yoo ignored those cases and compared any questioned government conduct
to the conduct in Hibi.74 Since the Supreme Court specifically found estoppel
unavailable in Hibi, the Ninth Circuit has reasoned that estoppel requires misconduct at least more blameworthy than that found in Hibi.75 Based on the
language of Hibi, the "affirmative misconduct" standards of both the Second and
Ninth Circuits are defensible. The key issue, however, is whether a standard of
"affirmative misconduct" is necessary. The summary nature of the Supreme
Court's disposition in Hibi, the unusual facts and equitable considerations involved, and the Supreme Court's failure to define "affirmative misconduct" indicate that the term has been given undue importance and should not be raised to
the level of a test for the allowability of estoppel.
The existing case law does not set forth a clear test for allowing estoppel in
immigration cases. By comparing questioned government conduct to the government's conduct in Podea and Lee You Fee, the Second Circuit's test 76 leaves unclear the degree of fault necessary for "affirmative misconduct. ' 77 Perhaps
recognizing this problem, the Second Circuit's holding in Cormiel-Rodiguez was
very narrowly drawn: "We do not, of course, suggest that noncompliance with
any regulation, no matter how minor its impact or importance, will automatically prevent the Government from deporting an alien. Our holding is limited to
the extraordinary circumstances before us."'78 Comiel-Rodn'guez thus applies only
when government agents fail to comply with a formalized procedure requiring
affirmative oral or written warnings. 79 Rather than protecting aliens, Cornie-Rod71 179 F.2d at 309.
72 236 F.2d at 887. In W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 34 at 184-86 (4th ed. 1971), Professor Prosser
distinguishes the negligence and willfulness standards of culpability applied in Poda and Lee You Fee respectively. See also Article, supra note 28, at 292 n.30.
73 532 F.2d at 306-07.
74 Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d at 493; Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d at 1330.
75 Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d at 493.
76 In a nonimmigration context, the Second Circuit has offered a different view of the "affirmative
misconduct" necessary to estop the government. See Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 948 (2d Cir. 1980)
(distinguishing cases of substantive ineligibility from cases of ineligibility caused by failure to fulfill a
procedural requirement).
77 See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
78 532 F.2d at 307 n.18. A subsequent Second Circuit decision appeared to render Corniel-Rodriguez a
mere aberration of the traditional viewpoint espoused in that court of appeals. See Goldberg v. Weinberger, 546 F.2d 477, 481 n.5 (2d Cir. 1976). But see Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 948 (2d Cir. 1980).
79 The argument for this narrow view of Corniel-Rodguez is presented in the dissenting opinion to
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riguez actually discourages the INS from establishing affirmative warning procedures.
The Ninth Circuit's apparent four-part test similarly suffers from its dependence on the problematic concept of "affirmative misconduct." The Ninth Circuit in Oki denied estoppel on the ground that a failure to act is not "affirmative"
conduct. 80 This emphasis on the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction seems inconsistent with the court's warning in Santiago: "[I]t would [not] be productive to
dwell overlong on the possible reasons for the inclusion of the modifier 'affirmative.' That term. . suggests a distinction might be drawn between nonfeasance
and misfeasance, but these are slippery terms."8 1 Despite its own admonition,
the Santiago majority proceeded to label the government's conduct "a failure to
act"sZ--that is, nonfeasance-because the officers failed to inquire as to the
alien's status. The dissent, on the other hand, found misfeasance in improperly
admitting aliens into the country.8 3 This disagreement illustrates the difficulties
involved in attempting to label a particular action "affirmative."
The Sun I1 Yoo decision also illustrates the problems inherent in Oki's dichotomy of "affirmative" and "misconduct." The court in Sun i1 Yoo allowed estoppel against the government based on the INS's "affirmative inaction" in failing
to process an alien's visa application within a reasonable time.8 4 As in Santiago,
the conduct at issue could have been described in either affirmative or negative
terms depending on the result desired. The court was favorably disposed toward
Yoo, however, and therefore labeled the government's failure to process the application "affirmative inaction." 8 5 The court in Oki, by contrast, had used negative terms and found no "affirmative" conduct in the government's failure to
warn.86

The Second and Ninth Circuits, unlike the other federal courts, have attempted to derive "affirmative misconduct" tests for immigration estoppel from
H'ibi. Unfortunately, these attempts have created more rather than less uncertainty. A new test for determining when to allow estoppel in immigration cases is
needed.
III.

Proposed Test

The federal courts should adopt a two-step test for allowing estoppel in immigration cases. This test would require (1) that the elements of equitable estoppel be strictly met, and (2) that the particular equities involved in estopping the
government weigh in favor of allowing estoppel.8 7 The first step of the proposed
Hansen. Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d at 951-52 (Friendly, J., dissenting). See also Martinez v. Bell, 468 F.
Supp. 719, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

80 598 F.2d at 1162.
81.
82

526 F.2d at 493.
Id.

83 Id. at 494-95 (Choy, J., dissenting). Addressing the misfeasance/nonfeasance problem, Judge Choy
noted: "Each one of the claims paraphrased negatively can readily be restated affirmatively. . . . But it
is not how we cast the facts, but the facts themselves that should dictate the nature of relief warranted." Id.
at 495.
84 534 F.2d at 1329.
85 Id. The inherent contradiction in the terms "affirmative" and "inaction" underlines the inadequacy of an analysis which would cause one to describe the other.
86 598 F.2d at 1162.
87 The proposed test generally follows the approach taken in United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697,
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test would require that all five elements of equitable estoppel a8 be established:
(1) The government must engage in conduct-acts, language, or silenceamounting to a representation or concealment of a material fact.
(2) The government must know the true facts at the time of its questioned
conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that the government may reasonably be expected to possess such knowledge.
(3) The government must intend that its conduct shall be acted on or must
so act that the alien has a right to believe it is so intended.
(4) The alien must be ignorant of the true facts at the time of the questioned conduct and at the time he acted upon such conduct.
(5) The alien must rely to his detriment on the questioned conduct of the
government. 89
The party asserting the estoppel should be required to prove each of these five
elements of equitable estoppel. 90 If he does so, a rebuttable presumption should
arise that the estoppel is allowable. The government would then be required to
rebut this presumption in the second step of the proposed test.91
The test's second step would require a balancing of the particular equities
and policy considerations involved in estopping the government. The competing
considerations here would be the tendency of the government's misconduct to
work a serious injustice and the tendency of the estoppel to cause undue damage
to the public interest. 92 In weighing the seriousness of the injustice caused by the
government's misconduct, the courts should consider the seriousness of that misconduct, its remoteness in time, 93 the duration of the alien's United States residency, the likelihood of family separation, 9 4 the alien's lost eligibility to a prior
right,95 and the type of right affected. 96 In measuring the damage to the public
703-05 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979) and suggested in Comment, supra note 28, at 383-84.
Ruby was not an immigration case, and the application of nonimmigration estoppel precedent to immigration cases has been questioned. Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d at 491. However, there seems to be no persuasive reason for distinguishing estoppel in immigration and nonimmigration cases. Precedent for "crossfertilization" is, in fact, available. See, e.g., de Gallardo v. INS, 624 F.2d 85, 88 (9th Cir. 1980) (immigration case cites land title case); Oki v. INS, 598 F.2d at 1162 (immigration case cites land title case); United
States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d at 704 (land title case cites immigration case); Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d at 1329
(immigration case cites tax case).
88 See J. POMEROY, supra note 1, § 805 at 191-92.
89 Id. Cf. United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d at 703-04 (applying four elements of estoppel "modified in light of the affirmative misconduct limitation"). See generally M. BIGELOW, supra note 1, at 631-709;
J. POMEROY, supra note 1, §§ 805-812.
90 Addressing an estoppel argument grounded in "broad principles of equity," the Ruby Court "found
no case which would allow the application of estoppel when there has been a failure of proof as to the
required elements." 588 F.2d at 704.
91 But see id. at 705 (petitioner has burden of proving both the elements of estoppel and that the
"equities" weigh in his favor).
92 United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406, 411 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481
F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1973).
93 Compare INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. at 5 (alien claimed estoppel 22 years after the questioned conduct)
with Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d at 1325 (alien claimed estoppel immediately following the questioned
conduct).
94 Compare Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d at 301 (alien sought to stay with father in the United
States) with Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d at 488 (Khan, an alien, sought to stay in the United States while his
family remained in Pakistan). See also IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW & PRocEDURE § 4.1c(l) (rev. ed. 1980).
95 See, e.g., notes 115-16 infra and accompanying text; Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d at 1329.
96 Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d at 1329.
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interest, the courts should consider the loss of legal protections, 9 7 monetary
cost, 98 effect on the separation of powers, 99 and the "sovereign" nature of the
immigration function. 100
The effect of the proposed test on immigration estoppel cases can be demonstrated by applying that test to Hibi and Santiago. Although Hibi's result would
be unaltered by the proposed test, the reasoning supporting the decision would
be very different. First, four of the five elements of estoppel are adequately
shown in the facts. The government's failure to publicize Hibi's rights and to
send an authorized naturalization representative to the Philippines concealed the
material fact of Hibi's right to be naturalized while he was in the U.S. Army; the
government knew or should have known Hibi's rights under the 1940 Act;' 0 ' the
government intended that its conduct cause aliens in Hibi's position not to pursue their naturalization rights;' 0 2 and Hibi was ignorant of the true facts concerning his naturalization rights.' 0 3 However, the fifth element of estoppel was
absent. Hibi did not rely to his detriment on the government's failure to publi04
cize his rights or to provide an authorized naturalization officer.'
Hibi's estoppel argument would also have failed the second step of the proposed test. Hlibi could not effectively claim that the government's conduct resulted in a serious injustice when he had not pursued his claim of citizenship for
twenty-two years.' 0 5 On the other hand, a decision for Hibi would have been
potentially damaging to the public interest. The cost of publicizing the rights of
persons qualifying under the 1940 Act would have been sizeable. t0 6 A potentially large number of similarly situated Filipinos might have asserted successful
claims for citizenship 0 7 without meeting the niormal naturalization requirements
of the Immigration and Nationality Act.' 0 8 Hibi also contained a special separation of powers problem; the Supreme Court was reluctant to overturn a foreign
policy decision of the executive branch. 0 9 Thus, application of the proposed test
to the facts in Hibi would have resulted in the disallowance of the estoppel. 1 0
97 See, e.g., note 65 supra and accompanying text.
98 See, e.g., Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d at 307 n.17 (distinguishingHibi based on differences in
the monetary cost of allowing estoppel); Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 748-49 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975)
(enormous monetary cost to the public outweighed injustice to the party seeking to estop the government).
99 See Asimow, supra note 6, at 195.
100 See United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 989 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1973); American Training
Serv., Inc, v. Veterans Administration, 434 F. Supp. 988, 1001-02 & n.35 (D.NJ. 1977).
101 In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931, 935 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
102 Id. at 936 n.6.
103 414 U.S. at 11 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
104 See Asimow, supra note 6, at 189; Comment, supra note 28, at 381.
105 See note 62 supra.
106 Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d at 307 n.17.
107 See note 63 supra.
108 See note 65 supra.
109 Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d at 496 (Choy, J., dissenting).
110 In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975) involved facts
similar to those in Hibi with two notable exceptions: (1) seven of the petitioners had attempted to apply
for naturalization prior to the deadline under the 1940 Act, id. at 938; and (2) the government was not
aware of any similarly situated Filipino veterans, Oversight ofINS Policiesand Legal Issues: Hearingbefore the
Subcomm on Immigration, Citizenship, and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciaqy, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (August 3, 1978) (statement of David Crosland). Given these additional facts, application of the
proposed test would result in allowing the seven petitioners to assert estoppel against the government.
Detrimental reliance would be established and the equitable considerations would weigh in favor of allowing estoppel. The court in 68 Filipinos did, in fact, allow these seven petitioners to assert estoppel
against the government, and the INS acquiesed in the result of that holding. On the recommendation of
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An analysis of the Santiago facts under the proposed test indicates that Santiago may have been improperly decided; the four cases were not so similar as to
require the same result in each. The Ninth Circuit should have remanded the
four cases for the factual determinations necessary to apply both steps of the
proposed test.
Of the four petitioners, only Khan and Paglinawan could show the five elements of estoppel based on the facts given in the Santiago opinion. First, the
government's admitting the four petitioners into the United States constituted a
representation that they were in fact admissible. Second, the immigration officer
in Khan's case knew the true facts since he had questioned Khan concerning the
whereabouts of the spouse or parent who had preceded him. I ' In the other
three cases, the immigration officer observed the visa number indicating the petitioner's status.12 Under these circumstances, knowledge of the true facts is necessarily imputed to the immigration officer and the government. Third, in each
case the immigration officers intended that their conduct be acted on by the
petitioners--that the petitioners enter the United States. Fourth, no evidence
existed suggesting that Khan and Paglinawan had any knowledge of the true
1
facts concerning the visa requirements prior to the deportation proceedings. 3
The record is unclear as to Santiago and Catam's knowledge;" 4 this element of
the test could have been addressed on remand. Fifth, the four petitioners relied
to their detriment on the government's conduct. Santiago, Catam, and Paglinawan could have returned to their homelands, picked up their spouses, and
returned legally to the United States." 15 In reliance on the government's conduct, they did not take that action and their wives' visas expired, 1 6 eliminating
the availability of derivative visas. Further evidence of detrimental reliance included the eight months" 7 and two years" 8 respectively, during which Khan
and Santiago labored to establish new lives for themselves and their families.
Only Khan and Paglinawan would not have required a remand to determine if the five requirements of step one had been met. However, in order to
apply step two of the proposed test, it will be assumed that all of the petitioners
were able to prove the five elements of estoppel.
The balancing test of step two reveals a serious injustice resulting from the
government's misconduct.' 9 Catam, Paglinawan, and Santiago lost the opporthe INS, the Solicitor General withdrew the appeal of 68 Filiinos on November 30, 1977. Id. The INS's
recommendation was based on "the distinctions between 68 FliWpinos and Hibi, and the equitable factors
involved." Id. While the INS has not conceded the allowability of estoppel, its actions regarding 68 Filii-

ns indicate that the INS will choose carefully the cases with which to test the estoppel concept in the
appellate courts.
Ill Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d at 490.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 493.
116 Id. at 490.
117 See In re Khan, 14 Imig. & Natur. Dec. 122, 122-23 (1972) afrdsub nor. Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d
488 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
118 526 F.2d at 490.
119 Of the four petitioners, Khan had the weakest case for the allowability of estoppel under the second
step of the proposed test. The parent from whom he derived his preference visa had died prior to Khan's
admission into the United States. Id. Khan had resided in the United States only eight months when his
deportability was detected. He was unmarried and his immediate family lived in Pakistan, not the United
States. Id.
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tunity to correct their entry and establish permanent legal residence in the
United States. Santiago was further victimized by having unnecessarily endured
separation from his wife and children for two years while he worked to save the
money necessary to bring them to the United States. At the same time, the public interest would have suffered little damage. No significant monetary cost to
the public was involved, and few other immigrants were likely to have been similarly situated. The separation of powers doctrine had only its usual significance;
no major policy typically committed to one branch of government was involved.
Assuming they were able to prove all the estoppel elements under step one, the
defense of estoppel would have been allowed to the four Santiago petitioners
under the proposed test, with the possible exception of Khan.
IV.

Conclusion

An unnecessary emphasis on Hibi's elusive concept of "affirmative misconduct" has created inconsistency in the federal courts' handling of immigration
estoppel cases. This note has proposed a two-step test which would alleviate the
uncertainty surrounding estoppel in immigration cases by abandoning the "affirmative misconduct" standard. 20 The proposed test would require aliens asserting an estoppel to (1) prove that the five elements of estoppel exist, and (2)
demonstrate that the policy considerations peculiar to immigration cases favor
estoppel. The proposed test would bring order as well as flexibility to immigration estoppel decisions.' 21 Hibi and its progeny have had their day; it is time to
bring consistency and certainty to this area of law.
Tom F Veldman

120 As Judge Choy suggested in his Santiago dissent: "Rather than juggle the terminology [of "affirmative misconduct"] found in the Hi opinion, I would inquire into the interests which the Hii Court
sought to protect." Id. at 496 (Choy, J., dissenting).
121 See United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d at 704.
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